Stingrays in Minnesota: What They Are, What the Law Requires, and What to Watch
"Stingray" devices—more formally, cell-site simulators—mimic a cell tower so nearby phones try to connect. They can reveal identifiers and help locate a device, but they also touch many bystanders. Minnesota has a clear statute requiring warrants for real-time device location—with narrow exceptions—yet transparency remains a challenge.

Cell-site simulators mimic cell towers to intercept device communications and location data
What a Stingray Does (Plain English)
A Stingray (also called an IMSI catcher) pretends to be a cell tower so phones in range will connect. That lets an operator learn device identifiers and estimate a phone's location in real time. Because all phones nearby may briefly interact, bystander data can be swept up too. 1
Minnesota's Legal Baseline: A Warrant Is Required
Minnesota law (§ 626A.42) prohibits government entities from obtaining an electronic device's location information—including unique identifier location—without a tracking warrant supported by probable cause, subject to limited exceptions such as exigent circumstances. Warrants are time-limited (generally ≤ 60 days, with similar limits for extensions), include notice provisions, and require reporting. 2
Federal Policies (Context, Not Binding on Locals)
Since 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice has required federal agents to obtain warrants for cell-site simulator use (with limited exceptions), and to delete non-target data. Updated DOJ guidance likewise emphasizes deletion and minimization. These are policies for federal use—not laws that bind local police—but they set a reference point. 3 4
Transparency Problems: Sealing, NDAs, and Public Insight
Even with a warrant requirement on the books, public oversight can lag. Past Twin Cities reporting found that Stingray-related tracking warrants were sometimes sealed or hard to access, despite the statute's notice and unsealing framework. 5 6
Separately, ACLU investigations have highlighted FBI nondisclosure agreements that pressure state and local agencies to keep cell-site simulator use quiet, complicating transparency. 7 8
Minnesota's State Court Administrator publishes periodic warrant reports under Chapter 626A, which can improve visibility—but they don't always give granular detail on cell-site simulators. 9
Related Trend: Location Dragnets Under Scrutiny
Beyond Stingrays, courts are wrestling with "reverse location" or geofence warrants. In 2024, a case before the Minnesota Supreme Court drew amicus briefs arguing that broad geofences violate constitutional protections—reflecting a general trend toward treating location data collection as a search requiring probable cause. 10 11
Practical Questions Minnesotans Can Ask
- Warrants: How many § 626A.42 tracking warrants for real-time device/identifier location were obtained in the last 12 months? 2
- Equipment: Does the agency own or borrow a cell-site simulator? From whom? Under what NDA terms? 7
- Minimization & deletion: What policies govern bystander data and deletion (even if modeled on DOJ practices)? 3 4
- Notice & sealing: After cases close, are affected individuals notified as required? If warrants remain sealed, why? 2 5
Sources
- General overview of cell-site simulator operation and bystander impacts; see e.g., ACLU explainer; Minnesota legal CLE discussing CSS operation. Minnesota CLE PDF.
- Minn. Stat. § 626A.42 (Electronic device location information): warrant, notice, reporting, limits, exceptions. Official text: revisor.mn.gov. See also chapter context: Chapter 626A; alternate codifications: FindLaw, Justia.
- U.S. DOJ policy (2015): warrants generally required; deletion/minimization guidance. PDF.
- DOJ interim/updated guidance (policy details incl. deletion cadence). PDF (2024) and FOIA-released policy material PDF.
- Local transparency reporting: FOX 9 investigation on sealed Stingray warrants despite state law. fox9.com.
- Star Tribune follow-up on sealed warrants and lack of notice to targets. startribune.com.
- ACLU-MN on FBI nondisclosure agreements affecting local CSS transparency. aclu-mn.org.
- ACLU national FOIA litigation over FBI CSS NDAs and secrecy. aclu.org.
- Minnesota State Court Administrator's report summarizing Chapter 626A warrant activity. PDF (2024).
- EFF amicus in Minnesota Supreme Court geofence case (location-data searches scrutiny). eff.org.
- Underlying amicus brief (EFF/NACDL/MACDL). PDF.